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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 15911

DANNY WAYNE SMATHERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with the
crime of aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah
Code Ann.,

§

76-5-405.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Defendant was tried before a jury on March 13 and 14,
1978, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., presiding.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty.

Defendant was

sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of five years to
life at the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the conviction of appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of November 9, 1977, defendant
approached the prosecutrix, Ms. Judy Stapes, who was working
as a bartender at Marion's Lounge in Murray, Utah (Tr. 8).
Defendant and the prosecutrix engaged in light conversation
and defendant asked her to go to breakfast with him (Tr. 8).
She said no.

Defendant asked her again and the prosecutrix

declined, saying "No, I really don't feel like it" (Tr. 8).
Defendant told the prosecutrix he needed "somebody to talk
to" and she said she would go to breakfast.

Defendant and

Ms. Stapes drove in her car to the China Inn where they had
breakfast.

They left the China Inn at 2:10 a.rn. and Ms.

Stapes drove back to Marion's Lounge where defendant had
left his car (Tr. 9) •

Defendant asked Ms. Stapes i f she would

go to bed with him and she refused.·
her "I've got $100.00"

Defendant then told

(Tr. 10), and Ms. Stapes said, "You

don't have enough money to buy me.

Will you please just

get ·out of the car and let me go home?"

(Tr. 10).

Defendant grabbed Ms. Stapes and shoved her up
against the door.

He grabbed the steering wheel and drove

the car behind the lounge.

Ms. Stapes tried to jump out and
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defendant grabbed her by the hair (Tr. 10).

Defendant got

out of the car and knocked Ms. Stapes to the ground.
started ripping her clothes.
on the nose (Tr. 11).

He

Ms. Stapes scratched defendant

Ms. Stapes testified at trial that

she was terrified of defendant (Tr. 11), and that

the

defendant had told her he was "going to kill me and throw i:r.e
in the river."

Ms. Stapes suggested they go to a motel:

"I thought if I could get him out on State Street where /I
could find a police officer or even to a motel, I knew
there would be people that would help me."

(Tr. 10).

Once again, defendant told Ms. Stapes he needed
to talk and she suggested they go to her house and have
coffee (Tr. 11).

Defendant told Ms. Stapes he was "going

somewhere where there are no cars."

(Tr. 12).

He kept

asking Ms. Stapes to go to bed with him and she kept telling
him no (Tr. 10,12).

Defendant stopped the car and Ms. Stapes

grabbed her purse, jumped out of the car and started to run
towards the nearest house with the lights on (Tr. 13).
yelled "Help me.

Please help me."

She

Defendant tackled her

on the lawn and started hitting her on the head, telling her
if she didn't "shut up" he would kill her (Tr. 14).
Ms. Stapes followed defendant back to the car.
He ordered her into the back seat and told her to take off
her clothes or he would kill her (Tr. 15).

Defendant then

had intercourse with the prosecutrix (Tr. 15) ·
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Defendant drove Ms. Stapes back to Marion's and got
out of her car.

She locked both doors and drove directly

to St. Mark's Hospital (Tr. 18).
Ms. Stapes was examined at St. Mark's Hospital
by one Dr. James M. McGreevy, who testified at trial that
she was bruised "principally about the eyes"

(Tr. 67), and

had "a minor laceration that did not require suturing above
her right eye."

Dr. McGreevy further testified at trial that

the bruising "was considerable to the extent I thought it
necessary to order examination of bony structures underneath
the swelling and bruising to make sure there was no fracture
of the bony structure of the eye socket as well as her
skull. "

Dr. McGreevy performed two standard tests, the

results of which did not positively indicate the presence
of sperm in the victim's vagina.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE IUFORMATION FILED WAS SUFFICIENT
AND APPELLANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
Appellant argues on appeal that the information
filed in this case was insufficient and alleges it failed to
state facts sufficient to establish the offense charged.
Respondent contends that in light of the statutory language
found in Utah Code Ann., § 77-21-8 and supportive case law,
appellant's argument is without merit.
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The requirements for sufficiency of an information
are found in Utah Code Ann.,

§

77-21-8, which states:

(1) The information or indictment
may charge, and is valid and sufficient
if it charges the offense for which the
defendant is being prosecuted in one or
more of the following ways:
(a) By using the name given to the
offense by the common law or by a statute.
(b) By stating so much of the
definition of the offense, either in
terms of the common law or of the
statute defining the offense or in
terms of substantially the same meaning,
as is sufficient to give the court and
the defendant notice of what offense is
intended to be charged.
(2) The information or indictment
may ref er to a section or subsection of
any statute creating the offense charged
therein, and in determining the validity
or sufficiency of such information or
indictment regard shall be had to such
reference.
In this case, appellant was charged in an information
which used the statutory name of the crime pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.,

§

77-21-8 (1) (a), and also stated the particular

of the offense, i.e., "That on or about the 10th day of
November, 1977, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
said Danny Wayne Smathers raped Judy Stapes by the threat of
death and serious bodily injury."

(See. Tr. 5, 6, Record 12).

The purpose of an information, as Utah Code Ann.,
§

77-21-8(1) (b} states, is to give the court and defendant

notice of the offense intended to be charged.

An information
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is not

insufficient as appellant contends b ecause it
· fails to

state all the elements of the crime.

See Peopl e v · McFarla~,

540 P. 2d 1073 (Colo., 1975).
In a recent Utah case, State v. Taylor, 570 P.2d
697

(Utah, 1977), where the defendant was convicted of theft

of a firearm and appealed on grounds it was error for the
Court, among other things, to refuse to dismiss the complaint
because of failure to prove elements of theft as charged,
this Court stated that:
Offenses are validly and
sufficiently charged by information
or indictment which uses the name
given to the offense by the cOriiii\On law
or by statute.
Id. at 698

(emphasis added).

See also Harris v. Smith, 541 P.i\

343 (Utah, 1975).
Appellant was charged with a specific crime,
Aggravated Sexual Assault, and was given the details upon
which that charge was founded.

On this basis, defendant

knew the crime with which.he was charged and was given a
fair and adequate opportunity to prepare his defense.
297
This Court in State v. Stites, 5 Utah 2d 101,

P. 2d · 227

( 19 56) , "las presented, in a misappropriation of

corporate monies case, with the claim that the information
was insufficient to apprise the defendant of the offense for
which he was to be tried.

The Court held that the employment

of almost identical phraseology in the information
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as was

found in the statute defining the offense satisfied the
provisions of § 77-21-8.

The Court stated:

We believe that the information
also satisfied the general rule applicable where there may be no statute
like 77-21-8.
that the information
must be sufficiently definite to (1)
notify the defendant of the charge
against him so as to enable him to
prepare a defense, (2) identify the offense
so that the defendant can successfully
interpose a double jeopardy plea . . .
and (3) apprise the court of the issues
before it so that it can properly rule
on questions of evidence and determine
the sufficiency thereof.
Id. at 229,

(emphasis added) .

In this case, the information charged appellant
with the offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault, the statutory
name for the crime he allegedly committed.

Thus, the

reasoning of Stites dictates that the information is sufficient to give notice to both the Court and the defendant
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 77-21-8.

However, following

the analysis of that case, the general requirements which
would be looked to only in the absence of statutory
provisions, are also met.

Appellant was clearly given

notice that he was charged with the offense of aggravated
sexual assault, in violation of§ 76-5-405, Utah Code Ann.,
and given the specifics of the offense; the information
alleged that appellant raped Judy Stapes on or about

-7-
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the 10th day of November, 1977, by the threat of death
and serious bodily injury (Record 12).
Recent case law from other jurisdictions is also
supportive of respondent's position.

In State ex rel McKenzie

I

v. District Court of Ninth Judicial District, 525 P.2d 1211
(Montana, 1974), where a challenge to amending an information
in a criminal case was made, that Court held:
The purpose of an information is
to inform the defendant of what he is
charged, nothing more nothing less
no bill of particulars is called for, nor
is a statement of all possible legal
theories the prosecutor intends to pursue.
It iS" not the function of an information
to anticipate or suggest instructions to
the jury, to argue the case, or to influence either public opinion or the
jury.
It is a notice device, not a
discovery device.
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. McKeeha:i
430 P.2d 886 (Idaho, 1967), held that:
The appellant was properly informed
of the exact nature of the charge against
him within the general criteria governing
the sufficiency of an information and
was afforded thereby the means by which
to prepare a proper defense . . . it is
neither necessary or proper to allege
evidence or disclose in the information
the proof which the prosecution relied
upon to establish the charge.
In a recent Montana case, State v. Coleman, 579 p.2d
732 (Mont., 1978), the defendant, charged with deliberate
homicide, aggravated kidnapping and sexual intercourse
without consent, challenged the information on grounds of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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insufficiency.

In rejecting his argument, the Court

stated:
. . . An information need only be
sufficient to apprise the accused of
the nature of the crime charged. It
need not be perfect.
Id. at 7 45.
Furthermore, if appellant deemed the Information
in this case to be insufficient, he could have requested ·
the trial court for a Bill of Particulars pursuant to Utah
Code Ann., § 77-21-9.

See State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332,

142 P.2d 178 (Utah, 1943), and State v. Robbins, 102 Utah
119, 127 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1942).
Additionally, the constitutionality of the short
form information allowed by 77-21-7 and 8 has been upheld.
State v. Hill, 100 Utah 456, 116 P.2d 392 (Utah, 1941);
State v. Anderson, 100 Utah 468, 116 P.2d 398 (Utah, 1941);
State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah, 1943), and
State v. Tacconi, 110 Utah 212, 171 P.2d 388 (Utah, 1946).
(See also, State v. Landrum, 3 Utah 2d 372, 284 P.2d 693
(Utah, 1955), where an indictment which charged that the
defendants had "robbed Joseph Shepherd" met the requirement
of Art. I. § 12 of the Utah Constitution.

It advised the

defendants of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them and met the requirements of 77-21-8 because it charged
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the defendants with having committed a crime and it stated
the act which the defendants did constituting that crime).

It is well settled that the purpose of an informatior, I
is to serve as a notice device to a defendant to inform
him of a specific charge against him and allow him to begin
preparation for defense against that charge.
Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah, 1978).

See State v.

Here appellant knew he

was charged with the crime of aggravated sexual assault
and the details upon which such charge was premised.
Respondent submits that in light of the statutory
provisions cited above and the case law, the information in
this case was sufficient and appellant's conviction should
be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS PERTAINING
TO AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
RAPE PRESCRIBE DIFFERENT PENALTIES
FOR DIFFERENT CRIMES AND APPELLANT
IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE PENALTY
FOR RAPE ON A CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT.
Appellant argues that the conduct prohibited under
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-402 for the crime of rape, a second
degree felony, is the same conduct prohibited under Utah
Code Ann., § 76-5-405 for the crime of aggravated sexual
assault, a first degree felony.

Appellant cites State Y.:.

Loveless, 581 P.2d 575 (Utah, 1978), as authority for his
position that since the two statutes prohibit the same
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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conduct, but impose different penalties, he should be
entitled to the lesser penalty as a matter of law.
Respondent concedes that if in fact the two
statutes did prohibit the exact same conduct and imposed
different penalties, appellant's reliance on this Court's
decision in Loveless would be justified and he would be
entitled to the lesser penalty.

However, respondent avers

that appellant's reliance on this Court's decision in
Loveless is misplaced in thattheconduct prohibited by the
two statutes is not identical and thus Loveless is not
controlling here.
In State v. Loveless, supra, the defendant was
convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault, a felony
of the first degree.

Defendant appealed.

The only matter

relieduponby the State as an aggravating circumstance

was

the fact that the victim was under fourteen years of age at
the time of the offense.

The Loveless court determined that

the two statutes did in fact prescribe different penalties
for the same prohibited conduct.

Specifically, if the victim

of intercourse without consent were under fourteen years of
age, the defendant could be charged with either aggravated
sexual assault, a first degree felony, or rape, a second
degree felony.

Thus, the statutory language left the

decision of whether to charge a first degree felony or a
second degree felony to the discretion of the prosecutor.
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The Court noted that the Legislature subsequently amended
the statutes to make the crime of rape, where the victim
is under fourteen years of age, a felony of the first degree
and deleted the element of age as a circumstance of aggravated,
sexual assault.
Here, however, the prohibited conduct is not the
same.

The crime of aggravated sexual assault requires that

the act of intercourse without consent be accomplished by
"serious bodily injury to the victim", or that "the actor
compels submission to the rape or forcible sodomy by threat
of kidnapping, death, or serious bodily injury to be inflickj
The crime of rape merely requires that .the intercourse takes
place without the consent of the woman.
§

Utah Code Ann.,

76-5-406 (1) and (2), defines "without consent" as follows:
An act of sexual intercourse,
sodomy, or sexual abuse is without consent
of the victim . • .
(1)
When the actor compels the victim
to submit or participate by force that
overcomes such earnest re?istance as might
reasonably be expected under the circumstances; or
(2)
The actor compels the victim
to submit or participate by any threat
that would prevent resistance by a
person of ordinary resolution.
To determine whether a victim consented, this

Court has looked to her age, strength, surrounding facts,
State v. Ward, 347 P.2d 867 (Utah, 1959); to "threats of
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immediate and great bodily harm which create in the mind of
the female a real apprehension of dangerous consequences,"
State v. Nunez, 520 P.2d 882 (Utah, 1974); to whether she
took advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape or
otherwise seek help.
P.2d 109

State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364

(1961); and to the conduct of the victim after

commission of the assault.

State v. Roberts,

91 Utah 117,

63 p. 2d 585 (1937).
In this case, the information charged defendant
with the crime of aggravated sexual assault and the element
of aggravation (serious bodily injury and threat of death) ,
was proven.

The Court instructed the jury that if it could

not find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, then
it could find him guilty of the lesser included offenses of
rape or fornication, or not guilty at all.

Thus, the jury

determined that the evidence supported the charge as stated
in the information, aggravated sexual assault, i.e., not
only did the rape occur, but it was accomplished by serious
bodily injury and threat of death.
Appellant correctly cites Rammell v. Smith, 560
P.2d 1108 (Utah, 1977), in support of his contention that
where there are two statutes which proscribe the same conduct,
but impose different penalties, the violator is entitled
to the lesser.

However, as the Court determined to be the
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case in Rammell, respondent contends that the statutes
pertinent here do not proscribe the same conduct.

In

Rammell, the defendant was convicted of a felony charge
under the Controlled Substances Act, and challenged her
conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding.

She argued

that since the offense of forgery under the Controlled
Substances Act is a felony and the allegedly same offense
under the Pharmacist's Act is a misdemeanor, she was entitled
to the lesser penalty.

I.

The Court in Rammell stated:

Proceeding to the main issue in
this case; we agree with petitioner's
premise that where there are two
statutes which proscribe the same conduct, but impose different penalties,
the violator is entitled to the lesser.
The difficulty with petitioner's argument
is that the two statutes referred to do
not prohibit exactly the same conduct.
Id., at 1109 (citation omitted).
The Court held that the Controlled Substances
Act applied more specifically to defendant's offense and
took precedence over the more general act.

Similarly, in

this case, the crime of rape, a second degree felony, is the
more general offense, while the crime of aggravated sexual
assault, a first degree felony, is the specific act; thus,
the two statutes prohibit different conduct and can correctly
impose different penalties.

In illustrating the difference

between the statutes in Rammell, this Court stated:
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i

There is a significant and important
difference between that statute and
section 58-17-14.13 which creates the
misdemeanor under which petitioner
seeks the benefit of a lesser sentence.
The latter section is in chapter 17 of
Title 58, which is entitled, "Pharmacists."
It deals generally with the dispensing of
drugs by prescription and covers all
drugs of every nature which have "been
designated as unsafe for use except under
the supervision of a practitioner,"
and it is not necessary that they be of
the class of "hard drugs" proscribed in
the "Controlled Substances Act." Inasmuch
as the latter act applies more specifically
to the petitioner's offense, it takes
precedence over the more general act.
Id. at 1109, 1110.
Respondent submits that the statutes involved in
this case are analogous to those discussed in Rammell, and
that appellant's conviction for aggravated sexual assault,
the more specific offense, should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Respondent asks this Court to affirm

appellant's

conviction for aggravated sexual assault.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

-15-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

